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Environment, Strategy and Performance: An Empirical 
Analysis in Two Service Industries 
Abstract 
This paper conceptually and empirically examines the Environ-
ment, Strategy and Performance linkage in two service industries. The 
paper's primary objective is to show that viewing these constructs as 
an insoluble system provides us knowledge that perhaps would not be 
forthcoming otherwise. The authors argue that delving into these 
constructs as a system within and between the two industries high-
lights certain disparities in conventional OT/Strategic Management 
thinking. 
Environment, Strategy and Performance: An Empirical 
Analysis in Two Service Industries 
One of the perhaps most promising ·but arcane panoramas of 
theory and empirical research that is. developing in the Strategic 
Management area is the interface between Organization Theory (OT) and 
Business Policy (BP). Mintzberg (1977), Miles and Snow (1978), Miller 
and Friesen (1977, 1978, 1980), Lenz (1980) and Hambrick (1981) have 
been some of the early proponents of such a marriage. Recently, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Aldrich (1979), Mintzberg (1979) and 
Ansoff (1979) have developed rigorous but at the same time highly 
creative extensions of such work. Chakravarthy (1982), Astley and 
Fombrun (1982) and Tichy (1982) have further developed such notions. 
Central to this Organization Theory/Business Policy interface 
is the primacy of the relation of Environment and Strategy. The 
central premise of this Developing OT/BP interface is that Environ-
mental and Strategy form one of the most basic and fundamental systems 
that provides for explanation of strategic phenomena.* The argument 
proceeds that Environment and Strategy are inextricably bound 
together: environmental conditions at least partially determine 
strategy and strategy in turn relates the firm to its environment. In 
this reciprocal process, strategy can "influence" the environment, 
even if ever so slightly, over a period of time. Proponents of this 
*Strategic phenomena refer to the exigencies and even vagaries 
of organizational life at the top levels that give rise to and then 




OT/BP interface either explicitly or more often implicitly posit 
that to split this basic system into either Environment or Strategy 
for relatively more narrow study is to do so at some risk. The risk 
is to reify either Environment or Strategy and erroneously make either 
one out to be the self-contained system. To conceptualize and do re-
search in this manner, according to this argument, is to produce at 
best partially valid knowledge and at worst fallacious results and 
conclusions. 
An alternative is to conceptualize and do empirical research 
in a relatively systemic manner that incorporates both Environment and 
rese(lfc"' 
Strategy. The purpose of this paper is to 1) briefly review why such 
systemic frameworks are warranted, 2) review how Environment and 
Strategy are construed in this newer approach and 3) to report one 
attempt to conceptually and empirically relate Environment, Strategy 
and Performance within and between two service industries. The 
authors hope to illuminate the fruitful promise of this new OT/BP 
interface. 
THEORY AND RESEARCH 
The following brief literature review will attempt to build 
the argument for the validity of viewing Environment and Strategy as 
an insoluble system and to support the research hypotheses for this 
study. 
Overview 
The view that environmental forces have impact on internal 
organizational structures, processes and outcomes is one that has 
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become commonly held. On this subject Kast, Summer and Beard (1980) 
write: 
The complexities and interdependencies in modern society 
accentuate the impact of environmental forces on organiza-
tions. The boundaries between organizations and their en-
vironments are becoming more permeable--external forces are 
having a greater impact on internal structures, processes and 
managerial practices. The development of open systems 
theories (has) highlighted the environment-organization inter-
face ... (2: Preface to Dess (1980). 
In this crucial interaction, environmental forces supply both threats 
and opportunities for the firm and "determine" the limits of action. 
Strategy is usually held to be that area where management bas some 
discretion in reacting to and "enacting" or creating the environment 
(Weick, 1969). At a general level strategy is seen as the content 
(the particular tactics) and the processes of formulation which set 
" how an organization defines its relationship to its environment 
in the pursuit of its objectives" (Bourgeois, 1980b:27). Until 
recently, Organization Theory researchers were interested in the 
effects of environmental forces on structure. Recently however, 
researchers in the emerging Organization Theory/Business Policy 
interface area have borrowed from the organization theorists 
environmental constructs to help explain the Environment ~ Strategy ~ 
Performance connection. 
Environment 
The _!:..erm environment, as with the term strategy discussed 
below, is a multi-defined construct. Most researchers would agree 
that the environment is that which is external to the organization. A 
little more succinct is the definition taken by the Purdue studies 
(Hatten, et. al, 1978; Schendel and Patton, 1978) that the environment 
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is that group of variables over which management has no (or little) 
control. Most would also agree that the environment creates important 
"strategic contingencies" (Hickson, et. al, 1971) for the organization 
which the firm must deal with in order to survive. Terreberry' s 
(1968) hypotheses that 1) internal organizational change is increas-
ingly externally induced and 2) organizational survival is a function 
of how the organization adapts to this turbulence are hypotheses that 
most would not disagree with. How to operationally define these rules 
of thumb however has become problematic. Add to these problems the 
distinction between a general environment (social mores, state of 
economy, etc.) and a task environment (particular stockholders; sup-
pliers, customers, etc. who have direct impact on the firm) (Dill, 
1958; Osborn, Hunt and Jauch, 1980), and one can see the potential 
confusion underlying the construct. 
Bourgeois (1980b: 33) provides a typology of the Environment 
construct to help add clarity to the issues involved. Environments 
have been defined in terms of 1) objects 2) attributes and 3) percep-
tions at both the general and task levels. These categories highlight 
the current debate over the proper way to operationalize the strategic 
contingencies posed by the environment. Is it better to operational-
ize the environment in terms of objective attributes or objects or 
subjective perceptions of these attributes in terms of amount of 
uncertainty engendered by them? Perceived environmental uncertainty 
(PEU), or the inability to predict the consequences of decisions made 
(Leblebici and Salancik, 1981), is held to be important in understand-
ing how firms are structured so as to allow for the flow of more 
information. The access to and the use of more information is held to 
5 
decrease or neutralize uncertainty. In relating environmental attri-
butes to PEU, Duncan (1972), based on Thompson's (1967) theory, used 
subjective reports of the degree to which the environment was seen as 
simple vs. complex (the number of task environment components) and 
stable vs. shifting (the rate of change in these components) to ex-
plain PEU. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) operationalized the environment 
in this manner also. Self reports on time span of feedback, rate of 
change in the environment and general uncertainty about particular 
events in the environment were used to explain PEU. Duncan (1972) and 
Leblebici and Salancik (1981) found that the rate of change (dynamism) 
better explained PEU than did the number of components in the environ-
ment (diversity). Lawrence and Lorsch found that as time span, rate 
of change and general uncertainty increased, firms became more dif-
ferentiated and integrated in their structures. 
Using subjective independent variables to explain PEU caused 
considerable debate (Downey, Hellriegel and Slocum, 1975; Tosi, Aldag 
and Storey, 1973). This led to an attempt to measure the attributes 
of diversity (complexity above) and dynamism (rate of change above) by 
objective indicators. The recent conceptual work of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) and Aldrich (1979) have developed these lines of 
argument. Aldrich (1979: 74) hypothesized that six dimensions: 1) 
Capacity, 2) Homogeneity-Heterogeneity, 3) Stability-Instability, 4) 
Concentratio~:Dispersion, 5) Domain Consensus-Dissensus and 6) 
Turbulence can describe environments. These dimensions allegedly 
affect all firms in their quest for survival. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978:68) collapse these six dimensions into three: 1) concentration 
of resources (diversity) 2) munificence of resources (abundance or 
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capacity) and 3) interconnectedness of the organizations in the en-
vironment. The work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) is based on a 
resource dependence view of organizations (where availability and 
exploitation of resources and interorganizational power are cr:ucial) 
and as such Aldrich's dimensions 2, 3 and 4 are excluded from direct 
analysis. These two recent conceptual forays have provided for a 
needed synthesis of the cumulative implications of the previous 
research. 
Dess (1980), put to empirical test a variation of Aldrich's 
formulation. He hypothesized that three environmental dimensions: 
1) Environmental Munificence - Industry Sales Growth 
2) Environmental Complexity Industry Product Diversity 
3) Environmental Dynamism - Industry Sales Instability 
objectively measured, could describe the competitive environments of 
most firms. Dess (1980) was successful in showing, through factor 
analysis, that these three dimensions account for 60% of the variation 
in 23 component item variables. Even though Dess (1980) attempted to 
delve into the accuracy of Top Management Teams (TMT) assessments of 
their environments and did not delve into PEU, his operationalization 
and measurement of the environmental dimensions were supported. 
Given the above arguments and findings, we can now posit a 
synthesis of environmental attributes (objective measures) and PEU . 
Figure 1, based on Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) illustrates the hy-
pothesized linkages. As mentioned before, the earlier work of Duncan 
(1972) who used perceptual measures of environmental attributes to the 
recent work of Leblebici and Salancik (1981) who used objective 
measures of the attributes, have consistently found that dynamism and 
not diversity most significantly relates to PEU. Presumably, the 
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organization matches diversity with diversity by differentiation; 
departments (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) or boundary spanners (Jemison, 
1981; Aldrich and Herker, 1977) are added to match increased diver-
sity. Evidently, these checks on environmental diversity are per-
formed without significant levels of uncertainty. Dynamism, however, 
produces a condition where placing probabilities on future outcomes is 
uncertain. Almost by definition this would cause greater PEU. Objec-
tively measured munificence has been found not to relate to PEU. The 
posited reason for this is that as the task environment grows rich in 
resources this would entail more slack resources (Bourgeois, 1981) for 
all organizations in the task environment. In abundant environments 
uncertainty as defined may exist but may not be perceived or if per-
ceived does not cause concern. A firm with slack resources may view 
taking losses as just part of competitive maneuvers and these tactics 
may not have much PEU associated with them . From these formulations 
we can pos1t: 
Hypothesis 1: The dynamism in task environments will explain PEU 
better than munificence, and diversity will have no 
effect on PEU. 
Strategy 
a. Overview 
Of the many attempts to outline what strategy is (see Hofer 
and Schendel,.- 1978 for a recent review), the most useful for the 
purpose of this research is to think in terms of (1) strategy content 
and (2) the processes of strategy formulation and implementation. 
Although the prescribed progression is Formulation ~ Content ~ Imple-
mentation, the components will be discussed separately to isolate 
content and process issues. 
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Strategy content attempts to focus on "which sets of strate-
gies (specific programs) seem to enable business firms to achieve 
economic success" (Bourgeois, 1980b:26). The programs stressed are 
which particular goals-means (objectives) structures are espoused by 
top management (Bouregois, 1978, 1980a), which markets are served 
(Buzzell, Gale and Sultan, 1973; Schoeffler, Buzzell and Heany, 1974), 
which diversification strategies are associated with high performance 
(Rumelt, 1974), which sets of generic strategies (differentiation, 
cost leadership or focus) are more appropriate for certain types of 
industry structure (Porter, 1980) and finally which grand strategies 
(growth, stable growth or retrenchment and turnaround) are more 
appropriate for certain sizes of market growth rates (Glueck, 1980). 
Strategy ·formulation, on the other hand, highlights the 
importance of scanning the environment for threats and opportunities, 
assessing the firm's internal strengths and weaknesses and forming 
distinctive competence statements ("What business are we in") which 
dictate goals and objectives (Ackoff, 1970, Andrews, 1980, Ansoff, 
1965, Uyterhoeven, et. al, 1977, Drucker, 1974). 
Strategy implementation is concerned with designing appro-
priate organizational structures and administrative processes so that 
the chosen strategy content can be carried out effectively (Glueck, 
1980; Quinn, 1977, 1978, 1980). 
b. Research Issues 
The choice of which component to use in operationalizing 
strategy is crucial to the purpose of the research, the nature of the 
variables that are studied, and the statistical validity of the find-
ings. Strategy content research usually is performed using at least 
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interval level variables with cross sectional research designs. The 
formulation and implementation research tends to be case studies, 
which are longitudinal but which use anecdotal evidence. 
Another issue in strategy research is. the· level at which the 
construct is operationalized and measured. Vancil and Lorange (1975) 
were the first to explicate a corporate vs. business level strategy 
distinction. Bourgeois (1980b:27) outlines this hierarchical cate-
gorization as follows: 
1. Domain definition strategy refers to the organization's 
choice of domain or change of domain that occurs when, for 
example, a firm diversifies into or exits from particular 
products or markets. Miles and Snow's "enterpreneurial 
problem" (1978) is of this type, as are Chandler's 
"strategic decisions" (1962:11). 
2. Domain navigation strategy refers to competitive decisions 
made within a particular product-market (e.g. industry), 
or task environment. Thus, once a domain or competitive 
arena has been determined by primary strategy, the organi-
zation is subject to the environmental constraints to 
which the contingency theorists attribute primacy. This 
level then, includes Churchman's "missions" (1968, p. 40), 
Ansoff's "administrative decisions" (1965, p. 6), 
Chandler's "enterpreneurial decisions" (1962, p. 11), 
Uyterhoeven's "competitive weapons" (1977, 16) and Hofer's 
"distinctive competences" (1973, p. 48). 
The distinction is important because in domain definition strategy, 
one is concerned with the "portfolio" issue (Hofer and Schendel, 
1978:55). Here, at the corporate level, the firm's strategy centers 
on pooling a group of "assets" (firms) such that either total risk for 
a given level of corporate return is minimized or return for a level 
of risk is maximized. The type of variables and issues studied at 
this level are very much different than the ones studied in domain 
navigation strategy. Here, the concerns are on strategy process and 
content which define how a particular business in this corporate pool 
of assets will compete and relate itself to its environment. It is 
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here that particular product/market designations are made, how much 
market penetration and geographic dispersion are desired and how wide 
the range of products or services will be (Glueck, 1980; Kotler, 
1980). At this level, one is also concerned with "distinctive com-
petence" (Selznick, 1957) and "excellence" (Drucker, 1954) which 
attempts to stipulate a unifying image and comparative advantage for 
the organization in its task environment. Indeed, it is this per-
vasive image or "character" which guides goals and objectives 
(Bourgeois, 1980a) and the particular product/markets chosen. These 
concerns are held to be unnecessary and could be burdensome at the 
corporate (domain definition) level. 
Most of the previous research that has attempted to link 
environment with strategy has done so at the task environment level. 
Evidently, the uncertainty engendered by the general environment 
(political system, mores, customs, etc.) gets too diffused to be 
captured empirically and tested for. With respect to task environ-
ments, Khandwalla found that managers who perceive their task environ-
ments as being more dynamic or uncertain would most likely institute 
strategies that were more "comprehensive and multifaceted" (Bourgeois, 
1980b:32). Miles and Snow (1978), Paine and Anderson (1977), Miller 
and Friesen (1977, 1980) and Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) have also found 
that strategists in more dynamic and uncertain environments "tend to 
be more proactive and innovative and they tend to assume a higher 
degree of risk" (Bourgeois, 1980b: 32). Recall that more uncertain 
conditions tend to generate the need for more information: more 
information is believed to ameliorate or at least reduce the uncertain 
condition. Boundary spanning (Aldrich and Herker, 1977) and explicit 
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environmental tracking (Ackoff, 1970; Aquilar, 1967; Andrews, 1980; 
and Keegan, 1974) are held to be appropriate tactical responses for 
these uncertain environments. 
While these studies have provided useful knowledge of these 
relations, they have fallen prey to the same problems of the Environ-
ment-Structure research: both the measures of environment and 
strategy are perceptual. Although, Hambrick (1981) did replicate the 
Miles and Snow (1978) findings using objective measures of strategy, 
his research was conducted in the health care, education and insurance 
industries. Only the findings from the insurance industry would be 
easily transferable to other private, economic organizations. 
From the cumulative findings of the research in environment 
and strategy cited above, the authors can posit the following hy-
potheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms in more diverse environments should match this 
diversity with internal diversity (Ashby, 1956). As 
such the firms in the sample will: 
2a. Report that they offer more services, deposits 
and loan types and employ more advertising media. 
2b. Will have a more diverse distribution of actual 
loan and deposit categories. 
2c. Will have more actual geographic dispersion of 
offices (main office plus branches). 
Hypothesis 3: Firms in more dynamic environments will attempt to 
elicit more information from the environment to 
neutralize uncertainty. As such the firms in this 
sample will: 
3a. Report that they engage in boundary spanning 
activity more than firms in less dynamic 
environments. 
3b. Report that they use explicit environmental 
tracking measures more than firms in less dynamic 
environments. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms in more dynamic and diverse environments will 
have perceived goal structures that are more diverse: 
Performance 
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they will consider more goals important and have higher 
importance scores than firms in less dynamic and 
diverse environments. The reason for the apparent 
confounding of independent variables is that goal 
structures can match diversity and through signalling 
competition and customers (Porter, 1980:75), gain 
information about the environment. 
Performance indicators are generally considered to be a subset 
of effectiveness indicators. Effectiveness criteria are usually 
considered long term phenomena: the organization that survives is 
considered to be effective (Gibson, Ivancevich and Donelly, 1979). 
While effectiveness criteria can apply to all types of organizations, 
performance indicators usually refer to quantifiable, shorter term 
phenomena. For private economic organizations, some return on invest-
ment or assets is usually used to indicate quantifiable returns to a 
group of owners. It is assumed that the more non-quantifiable "con-
straints" (Simon, 1964) to economic performance such as employee 
morale, ability to secure resources, etc. are reflected in the return 
on investment figure. 
Another classification of effectiveness criteria centers 
around a goal approach model and a systems-resource model and whether 
the criteria are judged internally by management or are imposed 
externally on them. The goal approach model, first presented by 
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957), simply asks what is effectiveness 
in terms of management's own assessment of themselves. If management 
is secure in its judgment of the degree to which their own goals have 
been achieved, the organization is deemed effective. This presupposes 
though that management is being honest with themselves and the goals 
were formulated in such a way that the organization is at least com-
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patible with its environment. Compatibility with the environment in 
this regard refers to goals whose attainment has provided the firm 
with strategies and tactical viability and has not jeopardized the 
firm's societal legitimacy (if this is an important strategic 
concern). 
Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), however, have noted the pitfalls 
of deception that the goal model can engender. Goals are fuzzy 
targets, are multiple and conflicting, and can be internally con-
sistent without relating to the reality of the task environment. They 
posited that a systems-resources approach would provide for a needed 
objective, outsider judgement of effectiveness. This model is based 
on the notion that modern organizations are open systems and thus 
engage in competitive and exchange relationships with their task 
environments. Effectiveness is the "ability of the organization in 
either relative or absolute terms, to exploit its environment in the 
acquisition of scarce and valued resources" (Yuchtman and Seashore, 
1967: 898) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The organization is most 
effective when it "maximizes its bargaining position and optimizes its 
resource procurement." This formulation places prime importance on 
relations with the task environment. Here the importance of inter-
organizational power relations with suppliers, competitors, government 
and customers would become salient (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Dill, 
1958; and Po~ter, 1980). In addition, effectiveness can be judged in 
this resource framework, at the most extreme position, without regard 
for the goal preferences of management. 
In reality though, it is goal preferences which limit and 
direct an organization's relation with the environment, so the two 
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approaches may not be as distinct as they were once held to be (Hall, 
1977:91) . As Child (1972) has posited, TMT can, in most circum-
stances, choose which environments the firm will engage with. In all 
environments, except where high barriers to exit exist (Porter, 1980), 
management has some discretion in choosing goals which help align the 
finn with perhaps more hospitable environments. 
An intermediate position in judging performance would be that 
of Hofer (1973, 1979). He postulated that return on value added 
(ROVA: dollar sales minus cost of raw materials and purchased parts) 
would 1) provide a return measure to owners and 2) provide a proxy 
measure for the organizations ability to secure resources and of its 
contribution to the task environment. Given the nature of the sample 
for this research though (two service industries), the value added 
construct does not apply . Accordingly, return on assets will be used 
as an objective indi cator. This measure is a commonly used indicator 
of overall financial institution performance (Reed, et. al., 1980). 
Given its hypothesized systemic orientation, it can be inferred that 
(except for new firms) a high ROA is associated wi th at least a 
partial command of required resources. We can now present the final 
research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms who make the appropriate Environment-Strategy 
link will have higher actual performance and will 
report higher levels of goal attainment relative to a 
perceived i ndustry norm. Specifically, for this 
sample: 
.:: 
Sa: Firms in dynamic and diverse environments, who 
exhibit more diverse goal structures and more 
diverse actual loan and deposit categori es, who 
have higher office ratios, and who use more 
boundary spanning and tracki ng wi ll be higher 
performers than firms who have inappropriate 
strategies for these environments. For less 
dynamic and diverse environments, the opposite 




As can be inferred from the above presentation, this study 
will seek to provide an answer to the following questions: 
1. Can the task environments of organizations be objectively 
described in terms of critical input resource information 
supplied to top management teams (TMT's) and Chief Execu-
tive Officers (CEO's)? 
2. Can this objective description be related to the amount of 
perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) as reported by 
CEO's and other members of TMT's? 
3. Can both the objective descriptions of task environments 
and PEU be related to both actual and perceived strategies 
in terms of product/market diversity and information 
gathering proclivities? 
4. Can alignments in environment and strategy, or environment 
or strategy alone, account for actual and perceived per-
formance? 
The following section will outline the research agenda used to 
provide answers for the above research hypothesis and questions. 
Sample 
The sample of this research is the CEO's and/or senior level 
management of the Banking and Savings and Loan industries in 
Louisiana. The main reason for the selection of one industry in one 
state is the hypothesis that the meanings attached to some of the 
perceptual va~iables by CEO's would be different in different industry 
settings. The choice of one industry would provide a consistent bias 
in the meanings attached to. the variables. Given the nature of the 
study, a constraint of resources also mandated the use of one industry 
in one state. 
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The second reason for the justification of this sample is that 
in March, 1980, the Federal Government passed The Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act. This piece of legis-
lation has led industry analysts (Business Week, 1980; McNeil-Lehrer 
Report, 1981) to conclude that the entire Depository Industry has been 
placed in a position where intense competition will prevail. Price 
competition, marketing competition and merger and acquisition tactics 
are predicted to be employed in this new competitive environment. 
These same analysts predict a shake out of marginal, less efficient 
firms or those that fail to take a proactive and aggressive strategic 
stance. With respect to this research, it is hypothesized that this 
turbulent industry would provide a rich sample for strategic research. 
TMT concern for scanning the environment and strategic response should 
be heightened in this new, partially deregulated setting.* 
Being designed as a one industry study, the entire population 
of banks and Savings and Loans in the state was invited to participate 
in the study. The questionnaires were administered to the Savings and 
Loan industry (127 Savings and Loans) at a seminar on Alternative 
Mortgage Lending in New Orleans, Louisiana on July 23-24, 1981. This 
researcher lead the participants through the survey questionnaire 
(discussed below) in three one and one half hour periods over the two 
ay period. This procedure produced 63 usable questionnaires repre-
senting 63 Savings and Loans . The entire Banking industry of 
Louisiana (264 banks) was invited by letter in September 1981 to 
*Inspection of most of the open ended questions on the 
questionnaire that dealt with perceived threat, distinctive com-
petence, etc. confirmed this hypothesis. The respondents were highly 
concerned about the deregulation of the industry. 
participate in the research project. 
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The invitation produced 92 
institutions who agreed to participate. After two reminder letters, 
44 usable questionnaires were produced and used in the analysis. 
Accordingly, a response rate of 52% for the S&L' s and 17% for the 
Banks was produced. Inspection of the geographic distribution of the 
firms yielded a good dispersion around the state. Inspection of the 
size distribution of the sample S&L' s showed good dispersion. How-
ever, the 44 usuable banks are mostly small to medium size firms with 
the exception that the state's largest bank is included in the sample. 
As such, the size distribution is skewed toward .the smaller end of the 
size scale for the banks. 
In order to participate in the study, respondents were 
required to be part of the Top Management Team (TMT) that had 
authority for setting the strategic course of the firm. For the 44 
Banks in the sample, the following breakdown of TMT (members occurred: 
32 CEO's, 2 Executive V.P.'s, 2 Senior V.P.'s and 2 Assistant V.P.'s 
responded. For the 63 Savings and Loans in the Sample, the following 
breakdown of responding officers occurred - 27 CEO's, 10 Senior 
V.P.'s, 3 Executive V.P. 's, 13 V.P. 's, 7 Assistant V.P. 's and 3 
Director/Attorneys. As such, the writer feels that those who re-
sponded to the questionnaire were those who in fact had strategy 
making authority and knowledge. 
Model and Variables 
Figure 2 depicts the variables and hypothesized relationships 
that were used, and tested for, in this research. Space precludes 
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an exhaustive explication of the variables.* Appendices A, B and C 
outline variable mnemonics and descriptions. While most of the 
variable descriptions are self-explanatory, some need a more detailed 
presentation. 
The various diversity variables--the Diversity Index of 
Industries Paying Severance Tax and the Diversity Index of Employment 
by Industry for the Objective Task Environment and the Diversity 
Indices of Loans and Deposits for firm Actual Strategy--are rather new 
applications for this type of research. The Shannon-Weaver index of 
specific diversity (Pielou, 1966) was used to serve as a summary 
measure of diversity. The formula is as follows: 
Where H' is the 
s 
H' = -I p. log p. 
1 1 1 
diversity index and p. 
1 
"species" present in a sample for i = 1, 2, 
is 
. . . ' 
the proportion of a 
s species . According 
to Pielou, "The more species there are and the more nearly even their 
representation, the greater the uncertainty and hence the greater the 
diversity" (1966:463). Thus, the diversity index measures "richness" 
or how many species and "eveness" or the distribution across species. 
Since the data for severance taxes, employment and loans and deposits 
is assigned to a fixed number of categories, the diversity index for a 
* This article will report, at a more aggregate level, the 
findings of this research. This level of generality is justified 
given the objective of the article which is to demonstrate the 
systemic qualities of Environment and Strategy. See Bigler (1982) for 
a detailed description of variable operationalization and sources. 
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given construct will really measure just eveness of distribution. In 
order to obtain a sensitive diversity index number then, as many 
categories (which will be constant for all the Parishes, Banks and 
S&L's respectively) as feasibly possible needed to be generated. For 
one example then, the p. would be the proportion of dollars in a 
~ 
specific type of loan or deposit account (the total number of loan and 
deposit types being the species) for i = 1, 2, ... , 
accounts. By stipulating s, the Ip . would equal to 1.0. 
~ 
s numbers of 
The Objective Environment Dynamism variables also need more 
explicit attention. The five variables shown in Figure 2 all try to 
capture, objectively, some aspect of variability of the critical input 
resource for these two industries: deposits. Although this opera-
tionalization is close to Dess (1980), the fact that it measures 
variability of the critical input resource in addition to using time 
series regression statistics makes it a rather unique approach to the 
operationalization of Objective Environment dynamism.* 
Statistical Methods 
In the conduct of the research three multivariate techniques--
factor analysis, canonical correlation, and multiple regression in 
this order--were used to reduce the variable pool and to test the 
research hypotheses. Multiple indicators of a given variable were 
measured and factor analysis was employed to develop index measures of 
*Dess (1980) operationalized his objective environmental 
variables predominately around sales statistics. Sales can be 
thought of as outputs and not resource inputs. Our interpretation of 
Aldrich (1979) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggests that objective 
environment should be operationalized in terms of critical input 
resource(s). 
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"dominant thrust." This procedure also hints at checking the internal 
reliability of the measures: variables will not load highly on a 
given factor if they are not sufficiently highly correlated. Canoni-
cal correlation, a rather new technique to strategic management re-
search, was employed to gain a macro perspective on the behavior of 
the entire research model. While not as global as structural linear 
equations analysis (Bentler, 1980), the authors feel that canonical 
correlation does provide an interesting overall "feel" for the 
behavior in Figure 2. Finally, multiple linear regression was used to 
actually test the research hypotheses. This robust technique allows a 
more penetrating and rigorous analysis of the research hypotheses. 
FINDINGS 
Consistent with the theme of the paper only the canonical 
correlation exhibits and the findings of the test of Hypothesis 5 via 
regression analysis will be directly shown. A summary figure will 
outline the status of the other hypotheses however. In addition, the 
factor solution for the Objective Environment will be reported since 
these constructs are in one sense the starting or revolving point for 
the model. 
a. Factor Analysis Solutions 
Factor analysis (Nie, et al., 1975; Kim and Mueller, 1978) is 
a statistical-technique which enables the researcher to construct 
indices of two or more variables that are sufficiently correlated. As 
such, the technique can reduce a variable pool to a manageable set of 
underlying constructs--called factors. Various groups of variables 
from Figure 2 were subjected to factor analysis and factor scores were 
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generated (see Nie, et al., 1975 for a description of this procedure~ 
even though the scores were actually generated using the SAS algorithm 
--see Helwig and Council, 1979) so that one number could represent 
each factor for each respondent in the sample. Appendices A, B and C 
contain the mnemonics and descriptions for the generated factors (see 
Bigler, 1982 for a detailed descripti~n of all of these factor solu-
tions). As stated before though, Table 1 shows the Varimax rotated 
factor solution for the Objective Environment variables. As one can 
see, the three retained factors of Abundance, Dynamism and Growth 
account for 88% of the variation in the eleven variables. The 
Abundance factor is a qualified factor name because previously hypoth-
esized diversity variables, TOTCOMP (the number of competitors in the 
task environment) and NUMBFIRMS (the number of tax reporting busi-
nesses in the task environment) loaded highly on what the authors 
called the Abundance factor. As Aldrich (1979: 69) has noted however, 
one can expect Abundant environments to be also Diverse environments. 
The Dynamism factor is composed of two of the regression variation 
statistics, as hypothesized. Finally, an un-hypothesized Growth 
factor emerged from the analysis. Upon reflection, this occurrence is 
common sensical since the other variables of Objective Environment 
reflect states or levels and the growth variables represent rates or 
flows. 
The remainder of the factor solutions showed good patterns and 
have, we feel, provided good indicators of "dominant thrust" (Bigler 
and Kedia, 1982). These are briefly described in the appropriate 
Appendices. If the reader is slightly puzzled so far by this admitted-
ly cursory presentation, perhaps the canonical correlation findings 
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and analysis below will provide for the needed closure and clarity . 
b. Canonical Correlation Findings 
A Canonical Correlation analysis was performed using the six 
dimensions of the research model shown in Figure 2 for both the Banks 
and the Savings and Loans in the samp_le. Canon~cal Correlation is a 
statistical technique that measures the correlation between two groups 
of variables (Nie, et al., 1975:515). A typical Canonical Correlation 
formula would be as follows: 
where the a's and b's represent linear weights and the x's andy's 
represent variables in the two groups to be correlated. The algorithm 
proceeds in a manner such that a host of canonical functions are 
generated, the quantity of which is given by the number of variables 
in the smaller of the two groups. For example, from the equation 
above, three canonical functions would be generated by the algorithm 
because the left hand group has only three variables. The weights are 
generated in such a manner that the first function derived will 
produce the highest possible (and the most significant) correlation 
between the two groups of variables; the second function will produce 
the second highest correlation and so on. The Canonical Correlation 
was performed on the dimensions of the model in an attempt to give a 
global picture of the relationships between pairs of groups of 
variables. 
1. Bank Canonical Correlation 
Figure 3 shows the various Canonical Correlations for the 
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Banks between the six groups of variables (dimensions) in the research 
model. The number either above or to the left of a connecting line is 
the Canonical Correlation statistic and the number below or to the 
right of the connecting line represents the significance level of the 
correlation. 
As one can see from Figure 3, the strongest links in the model 
that bear on Actual Performance, which is the ultimate interest in the 
study, come from the two antecedent objective dimensions of Objective 
Environment and Actual Strategy. The Canonical Correlation between 
Objective Environment and Actual Strategy is r = .8619 (p < .0001) and 
between Actual Strategy and Actual Performance, .4507 (.0592). The 
Canonical Correlation between Objective Environment and Actual 
Performance is . 5586 (. 0452). The highly significant Canonical 
Correlation at . 6412 between Actual and Perceived Performance is 
interesting as it suggests that the respondents' perceptions with 
respect to corporate performance are in agreement with actual 
performance. However, no causal relationship between Perceived 
Performance and Actual Performance is implied.* It appears, then, 
that the main contributions that will potentially explain Actual 
Performance will be the objective environment variables and the Actual 
Strategy variables. In rounding out our perusal of Figure 3, it is 
interesting to note that Actual Strategy, Perceived Environment, and 
Perceived S~rategy are all significantly correlated to Perceived 
Performance. It is as if there are two structures of alignment that 
*Although the converse can be argued. Since the index of 
Actual Performance includes a Four Year Average component in it, the 
historical information supplied by the Actual Performance Index can 
be said to partially explain Perceived Performance. 
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are taking place in the model. One alignment is with Actual Perfor-
mance and one with Perceived Performance. This position is 
strengthened by the fact that there appears to be no significant 
relations between Objective and Perceived Environment and Actual and 
Perceived Strategy. Conjectures as to why this phenomenon has 
occurred will await their turn in the discussion and conclusions 
section, after the appropriate regression analyses have been presented 
and analyzed. 
2. S & L Canonical Correlation 
Figure 4, for the S&L's, presents the Canonical Correlations 
between the six dimensions of the research model. One of the most 
glaring and interesting aspects of the Canonical Correlations is the 
non-significant correlation between Actual Strategy and Actual 
Performance. Recall that for the Banks, this was a significant 
Canonical Correlation. There is a mildly significant Canonical 
Correlation for the S&L' s between Objective Environment and Actual 
Performance. However, for the S&L' s, where there was none for the 
Banks, there is a slightly significant Canonical Correlation between 
Perceived Strategy and Actual Performance. Evidently, if this is a 
meaningful relation, there is some information supplied by one or more 
of the Perceived Strategy variables that significantly relates to 
Actual Performance. 
As with the Banks, there appears to be a second structure of 
alignment converging on Perceived Performance. Perceived Environ-
mental Uncertainty is significantly related to Perceived Strategy and 
Perceived Strategy is significantly related to Perceived Performance. 
As with the Banks, there is no significant relationship between Objec-
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tive Environment and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty and between 
Actual Strategy and Perceived Strategy. As stated before, this issue 
of dual alignment structures will be taken up in the discussion and 
conclusions section of this paper. 
3. Summary Statement Concerning 
the Canonical Correlation 
In this writer's opinion, the key features that distinguish 
the Canonical Correlation analysis of the S&L's from that of the Banks 
are: 
1) There is no significant relation between Actual Strategy 
and Actual Performance for the S&L' s and there is a 
significant relation for the Banks. 
2) The ·Canonical Correlation between Objective Environment 
and Actual Performance for the Banks is higher and more 
significant than the Canonical Correlations between 
Actual Strategy and Actual Performance for the Banks. 
This would suggest that some Objective Environment 
variable(s) strongly influences individual Bank Actual 
Performance. 
3) The Canonical Correlation between Objective Environment 
and Actual Performance for the Banks is higher and more 
significant than the Canonical Correlation between these 
~arne dimensions for the S&L's. 
While one would be hard pressed to estimate the statistical sig-
nificance of the differences outlined above, these same differences 
led the authors to make the following observation. It appears as if 
the strategic alignment of the Banks in their environments (both 
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strategy and environment measured objectively) is much stronger than 
that of the S&L's. When one observes that the link between Objective 
Environment and Actual Performance for the Banks is fairly strong and 
highly significant, one is led to the second conclusion that perhaps 
it is the tremendous market power and position* that the Banks have 
that makes their alignment between objective environment, strategy and 
performance seem to fit. In other words, it could be that given the 
way Actual Strategy is measured, the dominant market position the 
banks enjoy could effect alignment of strategy and actual performance. 
The Canonical Correlation points to a concept of dual alignment (dis-
cussed above). But, from another point of view, one could argue that 
in a power-position situation, perceptions are basically irrelevant. 
These ruminations.will be taken Up in the next section. 
c. Regression Analysis Findings 
Given the objective of this paper, only the regression results 
for the test of Hypothesis 5 for the Banks and S&L' s will be directly 
shown. However, Figure 5 shows the authors' evaluation of each of the 
other research hypotheses. As can be seen, we feel that the diversity 
matching diversity type of hypothesis is, on the whole confirmed by 
*A variable named Total Concentration Ratio was computed for 
each of the 64 parishes (task environments in this study). The ratio 
was defined as the total deposits of the top three institutions in 
each parish_, regardless of institution type, divided by the grand 
total of deposits in the parish (sum of total S&L and Bank deposits). 
In almost every parish, the first and second largest firms of the top 
three firms were Banks. Secondly, a variable named Among Market 
Share (AMMKTSH) was computed. The ratio was defined as the deposits 
of the focal organization divided by the sum of total Bank and S&L 
deposits in the Parish. The S&L's had a mean AMMKTSH of 9.5% with a 
minimum value of .12% and a maximum of 34.12%. The Banks on the 
other hand had a mean AMMKTSH of 16.7% with a minimum value of .01% 
· but a maximum of 100%. 
27 
the S&L findings, but not, on the whole, confirmed by the findings for 
the Banks. Why this phenomenon is so has been suggested by the 
results of the canonical correlation analysis: contingency alignments 
of the type tested for here do not seem to be salient for firms who 
enjoy a market power position. These conjectures will be taken up 
again in the discussion of the test of.Hypotheses 5, below. 
(1) Test of Hypothesis 5 for Banks 
In reality, it is impossible to test Hypothesis 5 as it reads 
because the sample size is not large enough to assign firms to the 
High and Low categories of the various dimensions of Environment and 
Strategy and then to test for alignment. A form of this alignment 
hypothesis could be tested, though, by the following procedure: 
regress all of the variables of Environment and Strategy on the Index 
of Actual Performance using Stepwise Regression with a stringent entry 
criteria (.15). This would minimize the possibility of multicollinear-
ity. If variables are found in the equation which represent the 
dimension of Environment and Strategy, with signs in the expected 
direction, the following can be concluded: a linear combination of 
variables which represents the dimensions of Environment and Strategy 
can explain an index of Actual Performance better than any single 
dimension. While this is not a pure test of the alignment hypothesis, 
it does lend credence to the position that there is something in the 
way these dimensions together describe reality (in this case Actual 
Performance) that is better than a single dimension alone can do. Of 
course, if variables primarily from either Envirnment or Strategy 
enter the final equation, then this would tend to disconfirm the 
alignment hypothesis. 
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Table 2 shows the four variables which meet the stepwise 
regression criteria.* The Index of Actual Performance (ACTPERFl) 
increases as EEDIVRS, OFFRATIO and BETA increase, but it increases as 
FULLOANS, the Self-Report Number of Loans Offered, decreases. As one 
would expect from the Canonical Correlation analysis (in Figure 3), 
the best linear combination of explanatory variables for ACTPERFl 
include variables mostly from Objective Environment. The only per-
ceptual variable that enters the equation is FULLOANS, but it has a 
negative sign. The scenario suggested by this model is as follows: 
the firms in more Diverse (as measured by Employment Diversity) and 
Dynamic environments, but who have higher Office Ratios and are 
thereby in more concentrated environments (recall OFFRATIO and 
ONEFIRMC are highly correlated (.8148, Sign= .0001), and who perceive 
that they have restricted or narrow loan offerings, are higher 
performers than firms who are associated with the opposite of these 
attributes. 
Statistically and practically, the model states that it is 
mainly a linear combination of Objective Environment variables that 
best accounts for ACTPERFl. Other dimensions and variables might have 
entered into the analysis without the dimensions of Objective Environ-
ment and Actual Strategy in the model. Given the dynamics of Stepwise 
Regression, though, no other variables explain more significantly the 
final model found above. *"k Given these arguments, this writer posits 
*The same model was found using a stricter entry of .10, with 
the same stay criteria of .10. 
-.!.-i:The reader will notice that this is a very conservative 
procedure. A General Linear Model approach could have been taken 
which would force all of the variables into the model, but the 
authors opted for a more conservative procedure. 
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the following conclusion: it is the relative condition that the Banks 
find themselves in that makes their competitive market power (as 
measured by OFFRATIO) one of the sole determinants of Actual 
Performance. The information supplied by FULLOANS, although it is a 
perceptual variable, supports this position. That is, a Bank in a 
relative power position can restrict the number of loan offerings and 
thereby perhaps concentrate only on the most profitable loan types. 
By this last piece of information, then, the interpretations of the 
previous hypotheses are supported. That is, it is in relatively 
concentrated environments, but ones which are more dynamic and 
diverse, that we see the non-use of diversity checking tactics that 
lead to higher profitability. It is clear, though, that it is the 
current concentrated power position that the Banks enjoy, and not any 
of the perceptual alignment measures that contingency theorists think 
are important, which best explains Actual performance. 
(2) Test of Hypotheses 5 for S&L's 
Table 3 shows the variables which significantly entered the 
stepwise regression equation* to explain ACTPERFl, the Index of Actual 
Performance. The equation is rather interesting with respect to at 
least two points: 
1) Although the equation explains a relatively large amount 
of the variation in ACTPERFl, its interpretation is not 
--
straightforward. With the exception of FACTOR2 and BETA, 
all of the other variables that were entered are per-
*The reader is reminded that all of the variables in the 
model were entered into stepwise regression using a rather strict 
entry criterion of .10. 
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ceptual in nature. Evidently, this linear combination of 
variables provides for an adequate statistical model, but 
its practical significance may be hard to uncover. 
2) None of the Objective Environment "Power" type variables 
(OFFRATIO and ONEFIRMC) enter the model, as they did for 
the Banks. The significance of this fact will be dis-
cussed in the Conclusions and Discussion section. 
A literal translation of this equation, grouped in terms of 
like variables, would proceed as follows. ACTPERFl increases as 
FACTOR2 decreases, but it increases as BETA increases. Evidently it 
is the inter-parish variation type dynamism measure (FACTOR2) and not 
BETA, the inter-parish volatility measure, which is associated with 
environmental perturbations and with a deleterious influence on 
ACTPERFl. 
ACTPERFl also increases as PCVUNPRl, the Factor which measures 
the Perceived Unpredictability of Government Behavior, increases, but 
increases as PCVUNPR4, the factor which measures the Perceived Unpre-
dictability of Rates and Investments, decreases. This is a rather 
inconsistent and puzzling finding. A consistent interpretation of 
this finding will have to rely on a discussion of correlations that 
did not enter into the regression equation. PCVUNPRl is positively 
correlated to ENVSCANl (.2184, Significance = .0965), BOURGE31, the 
factor that ~easures the Perceived Importance of Sources of Funds and 
Cost Consciousness (.2930, significance .03310), and NGOALIMP,* the 
number of Goals-Means Items Thought to be Important (. 2495, Sig-
*NGOALIMP, which did not enter the model. 
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nifiance = . 0567)--all of which are negatively related to ACTPERFl. 
Evidently, the perception of increased governmental unpredictability 
is associated with the use of uncertainty reducing tactics which have 
the effect of reducing ACTPERFl (probably due to the fact that these 
tactics consume resources in the short run). 
ACTPERFl also increases as PCVABUN3, the factor which measures 
the Perceived Abundance of Staff Personnel, increases and as PCVDYNMl, 
the factor which measures the Index of Perceived Dynamism, increases. 
As with most of the variables that were entered, the interpretation of 
these variables is rather problematic. This writer can offer no 
indirect analysis by additional variable correlations, as was done 
above, to help infuse these findings with practical meaning.* This 
writer can posit the following bold hypothesis to explain this 
phenomenon. The rather obscure Objective Environmental variables and 
Perceived Environmental variables enter the equation in Table 3 to 
explain ACTPERFl in part because of the absense of a dominant market 
position. As such, what is reported in Table 3 probably has some 
spurious correlation associated with it.** The R2 value is thus 
overstated with respect to what a more lean equation, with only 
FACTOR2 and ENVSCANl represented, would produce. The implications of 
this hypothesis will be examined in the following Discussion and 
Conclusions section. 
*Although there is some statistical relation. 
**This is confirmed by the fact that FACTOR2 and ENVSCANl are 
the only variables in Equation 1 which have bivariate correlations 
with ACTPERFl that are reasonably high (.3072 and .3869 respectively) 
and significant (.0143 and .0017 respectively). 
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DISCUSSION 
The first major idea from the research indicates that the kind 
of alignments contingency theorists posit (Environment-Strategy-Per-
formance, both in perceived and actual terms) become salient only in 
environments and markets that are less concentrated and, by extension, 
where less powerful firms (low market shares) vie for competitive 
viability. The logic for the position gets some support from current 
literature (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, and Aldrich, 1979) but the 
writer has implicitly invoked another construct (market power 
position) to make sense of this interpretation. The argument runs as 
follows: 
1. Both Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Aldrich (1979) argue 
that greater uncertainty is caused by higher environmental con-
centration (which can cause dependence of some organizations on 
others), and higher interconnectedness or interdependence which 
causes greater turbulence and instability. All of these features can 
be problematic for the focal organization by lessening the proba-
bility of the firm to be able to control its own destiny. However, 
Aldrich (1979:69-71) posits that higher turbulence is also caused by 
higher abundance (capacity) in environments which leads to higher 
diversity. As the findings of this research show though, one measure 
of diversity (as measured by 1-0NEFIRMC) is positively correlated 
:. 
with the Objective Environment Abundance Factor. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) provide some support for dealing with this conundrum. 
They posit that "System connectedness, then, is a substitute for con-
centration in that both assure predictability and provide 
increasingly powerful levers for change" (1978: 70). This system 
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connectedness is negotiated by such mechanisms as joint ventures, 
trade association activity, coalitions and cartels (1978:175-182), to 
name a few. The point is that firms move to "concentrate" problem-
atic environments either through mechanisms to enhance system 
connectedness or through outright moves to improve concentration 
(mergers, acquisitions, etc.). Seemingly, both of these movements 
can operate at the same time* or conceivably they could be opposed to 
one another. That is, greater diversity might spell disaster for 
attempts to concentrate an industry. 
2. The proposition above is predicated on the fact that for 
the Banks, who are held by the writer to be in the dominant power 
position in the industry, mostly objective variables explain 
ACTPERFl. While these objective variables (of Objective Environment 
and Actual Strategy) do form a type of linkage, they do not support a 
diversity matches diversity hypothesis where contingency theorists 
posit that the perceptual type variables should be integral in the 
overall linkage process (Slocum and Hellriegel, 1979). Aldrich 
(1979:122-125) argues that this tendency to view perceptual variables 
as important in the alignment process results from a commitment to a 
rational selection view versus an environmental selection viewpoint. 
In the Rational Selection model (Child, 1972) actors are held to be 
able to have a control over their destiny: therefore, their percep-
tions of c.fitical contingencies ought to at least be a part of 
decision processes, if not help to rationally guide them. In the 
*Indeed, recall that the Abundance Factor bas a previously 
hypothesized Diversity Component (Number of Competitors) in it. 
Presumably, the mechanisms of system connectedness would be found in 
environments of greater diversity. 
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Environmental Selection model, perception and rational choice, in the 
strong form of this argument, are completely irrelevant. Firms and 
their strategies are selected for by certain selection criteria in the 
environment: firms with "fit" strategies are selected for, those with 
unfit strategies are selected against. To return to the argument at 
hand, one does not know for the Banks whether the strategies which 
lead to market dominance were rationally chosen, or whether their 
dominance was a result of social sanction and legal decree which 
"selected" for the Banks without their active coJIDIIission. For the 
S&L's, on the other hand, their lower power position made possible the 
entry of largely perceptual variables into the regression model that 
explains ACTPERFl. Aldrich (1979:68) has posited that " ... position in 
the environment becomes important in the selection process when 
elements are concentrated rather than dispersed." The writer argues 
that since the S&L's lack a power position, on average, in the 
industry, perceptual alignment variables have the occasion to enter 
the model. Aside from the everpresent possibility of spurious cor-
relation here, one can assume that since the S&L' s lack a very 
critical ingredient--power position--in a rather concentrated 
environment, perceptual alignment type variables are everpresent on 
the respondents minds. In other words, if firms in less concentrated 
environments ought to provide for the proper alignment of Environment 
and Strategy_ (both actual and perceptual), then the Banks in this 
sample can ignore these prescriptions and still be high performing. 
So it seems that market power position is a moderating construct 
allowing for greater or lesser importance or salience of perceiving 
environments. A strong power position could make for lesser 
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importance being placed on accurately perceiving environmental 
contingencies, as the interpretation here has suggested. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978:62) have argued "Important elements of the environment 
may be invisible to organization decision-makers, and hence, not 
considered in determining organizational actions, but these same 
elements can affect organizational success or failure." For the 
Banks in this sample, market power position, as measured by ONEFIRMC, 
AMMKTSH and MKTSHARE, are posited by the writer to be those elements 
in the environment which have made for perceptual dynamics to be 
relatively less important. This position is certainly in the spirit 
of the slack resources argument which prompted Hypotheses 5 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert and March, 1963:36-38). Khandwalla 
(undated:SS) provides support for this argument by positing that it 
is only in more competitive environments that such things as 
tolerance for change and ambiguity become important for the 
organization and that in these environments small (less powerful 
firms) are unlikely to survive. Parker (1981) has argued for the 
perceptual and objective alignment position for Banks. However, 
Parker implicitly assumed that with the deregulation of the industry 
all Bank environments would become more competitive at similar 
velocities. The Banks in this sample for 1981 still appear to enjoy 
a relative power position to that of the S&L's.* By inference, it 
would seem to behoove already powerful firms to attempt to maintain a 
relative power position wherever possible (Porter, 1980). For the 
*Most industry analysts expect that this 
change, certainly by 1986, when the industry is 
completely deregulated (Business Week, 1982). 
situation will 
expected to be 
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two industries in this study, given the fact of their deregulation, 
feasible alternatives for this end would be lobbying activity and 
aggressive geographic expansion by merger and acquisition, subject to 
antitrust type considerations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 
1979). These tactics would of course consume scarce resources. 
Conversely, it would also appear that as environmental conditions get 
less concentrated and perhaps more competitive (recall that ONEFIRMC 
and FACTOR! are negatively correlated), firms would find it expedient 
to provide for the proper objective and perceptual alignments. The 
precise nature of these alignments for this type of industry cannot 
be exhaustively enumerated by this research. However, feasible 
alternatives would include environmental scanning activity (Jemison, 
1981), distinctive competence-image building for older but less 
powerful (lower market share) firms and other market share building 
activities (Hammermesh, Anderson, and Harris, 1978). These alignment 
activities would also certainly expend resources. However, if the 
findings of this study for the S&L's are valid, it would appear that 
providing for alignment in more competitive environments would 
eventually lead to higher Actual Performance.* (See the PIMS 
research, Schoeffler, Buzzell and He any, 197 4; Buzzell, Gale and 
Sultan, 1975, for the same argument for expending current resources 
to build market share.) An interesting trade off emerges from the 
two sets of costs outlined above: is it better to expend resources 
to maintain a relative power position or to expend resources to 
*The reader is reminded that this is really a conjecture 
since a practical, straightforward interpretation of the test of 
Hypothesis 6 for the S&L's is problematic. 
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provide for necessary contingency alignment?* Obviously, these 
decisions would never be totally bifurcated. But a propensity for one 
avenue over another would perhaps be determined by the firm's current 
position--old or new? small or large?--and perceptions on how rapidly 
the task environment will become more competitive. As with Porter 
(1980), though, the advantage would probably lie in building the 
relative power position through erecting barriers to entry or other 
interdependence management strategies and tactics. For the firms who 
can build entry barriers (i.e., those already in the industry), 
environmental conditions are known to be relatively benevolent. 
However, the analogies to erecting entry barriers, neutralizing the 
power of "buyers" and "suppliers,"** and dampening the threat of 
substitute products--tactics to insure a relative power position--have 
not been studied yet for service-type industries. 
The second major contribution that emanates from this research 
is the fact that a concept of dual Environment-Strategy-Alignment 
might describe reality better for some firms than for others. It 
might also serve to clarify some of the conflicting findings in 
previous research of Perceived Environment. 
Largely unattended to in the Analysis section was the sig-
nificance of the positive Canonical Correlations of various dimensions 
with Perceived Performance. The writer is moved to wonder whether it 
*Recall that creating a market power position as has been 
presented and argued for here, is to provide for a type of Environ-
ment-Strategy linkage. This type of linkage does not respect the 
diversity matches diversity hypothesis that contingency theorists 
posit however. 
*The terms "buyers" and "suppliers" as Porter (1980) uses them 
are not wholly appropriate for this kind of industry. 
·- --- -~··-- -~-------
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is for nothing that these alignments occur. 
Why do these linear combinations of variables account for so 
much of the variance in perceived performance? Since the Banks are a 
more dramatic example with respect to this question, the comments 
below will pertain mostly to them. Aside from the possibility that 
some spurious correlation exists, the writer can posit the following 
argument. To reiterate, it seems that, for the Banks, the Perceptual 
measures of Environment, Strategy and Performance form a linkage 
system that is distinct from the Actual linkage.* This writer would 
argue that this separate perceptual linkage system could provide 
management with an internally consistent "mind-set," so to speak, part 
of which could be associated with current Actual Performance but 
another part which might not produce actual impact for several time 
periods hence. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:16) have posited that a 
ubiquitous need for understanding the dynamics of social environments 
exists in the minds of top level decision-makers. This internally 
consistent "mind-set" could provide for a necessary perception of 
wholeness or closure which may or may not be related to current Actual 
Performance. As such, these current perceptual linkages could foment 
and mature so to speak, only to effect actual performance some time in 
the future. Newer research which delves into managerial ideology 
(Starbuck, 1982 and Miller, undated) conceptually supports this 
speculation. On the other hand, a current cross sectional picture of 
this "mind-set" may also never become to be associated with actual 
*The writer has described these as distinct linkages because 
of the fact that the Canonical Correlation Analysis for both the 
Banks and the S&L' s showed no correlations between Objective and 
Perceived Environment or Actual and Perceived Strategy. 
- ~---~ ~--
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performance in the future. Changing environmental conditions could 
cause a TMT to "forget" a current mind-set as they struggle to form a 
new one. By introducing a longitudinal aspect to these perceptual 
linkages, ·perhaps some of the inconsistencies in the Perceived 
Environment research could be accounted for. Unfortunately, the 
findings for the S&L's obscure this position somewhat. However, the 
writer feels that the "dual alignment" construct is valid and would 
provide for some interesting future research.* 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper was to demonstrate that Environ-
ment and Strategy can be construed and examined as a fundamental and 
insoluble system. What emerged was a rather descriptive argument for 
this position: the findings of the research suggest that viewing 
these constructs as a system gives us knowledge that possibly would 
not have been forthcoming otherwise. Implicit in this position is the 
need to work on the "whole" of the system, so that its integrity can 
become manifest. 
However, this descriptive argument is not the same as a pre-
scriptive argument where hypothesized causal laws and a persuasive 
conceptual "ground" are presented. If this search for "strategic 
*See Ansoff (1979) for a similar bifurcation of 1) competitive 
strategy (products, markets, etc.) and 2) legitimacy strategy 
(managing corporate social response) . Although these two categories 
are different from the ones discussed above, they are similar to the 
dual-alignment hypothesis in the sense that it charges top management 
with the responsibility of developing strategies that may in the short 
run be in conflict with each other or at least vie for possibly scarce 
resources. 
40 
system integrity" is warranted, we feel that the field awaits a 
particularly analytic and creative mind to supply some initial 
advances . 
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Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
Dynamism 
Source: Adapted from: Pfeffer, J. and Gerald R. Salancik, The External 
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, 
Harper and Row, New York, 1978, p. 68. 
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Not Testable as Stated. Some Evidence for a 
Type of Alignment, However. 
Largely Disconfirmed due to low R2 values. 
However, Most of the Variables that Enter 
are Conceptually Appropriate and the r 
Signs are in the Right Direction. 
Mixed Results: Tentatively Confirmed, Though 
Disconfirmed - No Significant Variables 
Entered a Model 
Tentatively Confirmed 
Not Testable as Stated. Some Evidence for 
a Type of Alignment, However. 
TABLE 1 
VARIKAX ROTATED FACTOR SOLUTION FOR OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT* 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 COMMUNALITY 
Abundance Dynamism Growth 
TOTPARDE *0.96956 -0. 12326 -0.12807 .9717 TOTAL PARISH DEPOSITS 
PARSHPOP *0.97686 -0.13224 0.03926 .9733 PARISH TOT POPULATION 
PARDEGRO -0.14425 0.03114 *0.75942 .5985 GROWTH PARISH DEPOS 
PARPOPGRO 0 . 07332 -0.04469 *0.81995 .6797 POPULATION GROwrH 
COVEMP *0.97891 -0.10120 -0.08356 .9755 COVERED EMPLOY 
NUMBFIRMS *0.98223 -0.13499 0.00817 .9831 NO OF REPORTING UNITS 
WAGEPAID *0.90144 -0.09129 -0.12625 .8369 WAGES PAID 
TOTCOMP *0.91162 -0.21063 -0.11493 .8886 TOTAL NO COMPET 
STDERORB-T *0.85180 -0.13272 0.17502 .7738 STD EROR BETA-TIHE REGRESS 
STDERORB-S -0.17687 *0.98405 0.00368 .9997 STD EROR BETA-STATE REGRESS 
COEFVAR -0.17446 *0.98386 -0.02087 _.:.!989 COEF OF VAR-STATE REGRESS 
Eigenvalue 6.274 2.071 1.334 9.679 
Percent of 
Total Variance 
Explained 57.00 18.80 12.10 88.00 
* Star to the left of variable loadings indicates variables which have met a .50 cutoff point. 
- - - -- - -- --- -
TABLE '3 
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 5 FOR BANKS 
EQUATION 1: 
ACTPERF1 = -3.8565 + 5.2822(EEDIVRS) 
F = 4.55 
(.0411) 
+ 2.7000(0FFRATIO) 
F = 8.66 
(.0062) 
- .2568(FULLOANS) 
F = 19.13 
(.0001) 
+ .1083(BETA) 
F = 3.06 
(.0902) 
2 R = .4871 
F = 7.12 
P(F) = .0004 
TABLE J 
TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 5 FOR S&L' s 
EQUATION 1: 
ACTPERF1 = -.4456 - .4931(FACTOR2) - .4605(BOURGE31) - .5296(ENVSCAN1) + .2852(PCVABUN3) 
F = 5.97 F = 10.62 F = 21.35 F = 5.14 (.0194) (.0024) (.0001) (.0292) 
+ .3872(PCVUNPR1) - .3059(PCVUNPR4) + .3206(PCVDYNM1) + .1733(BETA) 
F = 8.32 F = 5.44 F = 5.83 F = 3.16 (.0064) (.0251) (.0207) (.0837) 
2 R = .5808 
F = 6.58 
P(F) = .0001 
APPENDIX A 
LIST OF OBJECTIVE ENVIRONMENT VARIABLE 
MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
A. The following variables comprise FACTOR1-FACTOR3: 
1. FACTORl (Munificence) 
a. TOTPARDE = 1980 Total Parish Deposits (S&L's +Banks) 
b. PARSHPOP = 1980 Total Parish Population 
c. COVEMP = 1980 Average Covered Employment (Average 
Employment in Establishments Covered by the 
Louisiana Employment Security Law) 
d. NUMBFIRMS = 1979 Number of Establishments Filing 
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, 
Treasury Form 941 
e. WAGEPAID = 1980 Total Wages Paid in Establishments 
Covered by the Louisiana Employment Security 
Law 
f. TOTCOMP =Total Number of S&L's and Banks in the 
Parish 
g. STDERORB-T = Standard Error of Beta for the Parish Time 
Regression 
2. FACTOR2 (Dynamism) 
a. STDERORB-S = Standard Error of Beta for the Parish-State 
Regression 
c. COEFVAR = Coefficient of Variation for the Parish-
State Regressions 





= 1972-1980 Growth in Total Parish Deposits 
= 1972-1980 Growth in Total Parish 
Population 
4. The following variables are Objective Enviroment Variables 
which were dropped from the Factor Analysis, but which were 











One Firm Concentration Ratio (Highest One 
Firm Deposits in Parish (either Bank or 
S&L I Total Bank and S&L Deposits 
One Firm Diversity (1 - ONEFIRMC) 
Parish Employment Diversity Index 
Parish Severance Tax Diversity Index 
Objective Environment Volatility Type 
Dynamism Measure 
APPENDIX B 
LIST OF VARIABLE MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR BANKS 
MAIN ANALYSIS VARIABLES: 
PCVUNPRl = Perceived Government Unpredictability Factor 
PCVUNPR2 = Perceived Competitor and Sources of Funds 
Unpredictability Factor 
PCVUNPR3 = Perceived Financial Rates and Supply of 
Investments Unpredictability Factor 
PCVUNPR4 = Perceived Sources and Uses of Funds 
Unpredictability Factor 
PCVUNPRS = Perceived Customer Demand for Services 
Unpredictability Factor 
PCVABUNl = Perceived Abundance of Line Personnel 
Factor 
PCVABUN2 = Perceived Abundance of Staff 
Personnel Factor 
PCVTHRTl = Perceived Competitor Threat Factor 
PCVTHRT2 = Perceived Externality Threat Factor 
PCVDVRSl = Perceived Competitor and Market 
Diversity Factor 
PCVDYNMl = Perceived Services Dynamism Factor 
PCVDYNM2 = Perceived Technological and Deposit 
Trends Dynamism Factor 
ENVSCANl = Perceived Environmental Scanning Factor 
ENVSCAN2 = Perceived Competitor and Client 
Scanning Factor 
PCVPERFl = Perceived Performance - "Financial" Factor 
PCVPERF2 = Perceived Performance - "Soft-Peformance" 
Factor 

















LIST OF VARIABLE MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR BANKS (Continued) 
BOURGEll = Perceived Importance of Firm Image and Employee 
Deve~opment Factor 
BOURGE12 = Perceived Importance of Sources and Uses of 
Funds Factor 
BOURGE13 = Perceived Importance of Marketing for 
Penetration Factor 
BOURGE21 = Perceived Importance of Community Enhance-
ment by Competitive Tactics Factor 
BOURGE22 = Perceived Importance of Image Maintenance 
Factor 
BOURGE31 = Perceived Importance of Financial and 
Market Power Factor 
BOURGE41 = Perceived Importance of External Relations 
Factor 
BOURGE42 = Perceived Importance of Sources and Uses of 
Funds for Market Penetration 
ONEFIRMC = One Firm Concentration Ratio 
ONEFIRMD = One Firm Diversity 
EEDIVRS = Parish Employment Diversity Index 
TAXDIVRS = Parish Severance Tax Diversity Index 
BOUNDSPAN = Perceived Propensity to Boundary Spanning 
Activity 
LOANDIV = Diversity Index of Firm Loan Categories 
DEPOSDIV = Diversity Index of Deposit Categories 
OFFRATIO = Number of Firm Offi ces/Total Bank 
Offices in Parish 
TOTOFFRATIO = Number of Firm Offices/Total Bank + S&L 
Offices in Parish 



















LIST OF VARIABLE MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR BANKS (Continued) 
FULLACNT = Self-Report Number of Deposit Types 
Offered 
FULLSERV = Self-Report Number of Services Offered 
HIADVERT = Self-Report Number of Advertising Media 
Used 
NGOALIMP = Count of Goals-Means Items Scored at 
Important and Very Important 
FACTORl = Objective Environment Munificence Factor 
FACTOR2 = Objective Environment Variation Type 
Dynamism Factor 
FACTOR3 = Objective Environment Growth Factor 
BETA = Objective Environment Volatility Type 
Dynamism Variable 
Other Variables 
PCVGENCD = Perceived General Conditions of Environmental 
Uncertainty, Stability and Unpredictability 
ENVTHRT = Perceived General Threat from the 
Environment 
TOTDEPOS = Total Firm Deposits (Savings) 
MKTSHARE = Firm Deposits/Total Bank Deposits in Parish 






LIST OF VARIABLE MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR S&L'S 
MAIN ANALYSIS VARIABLES: 
PCVABUNl = Perceived Abundance of Line Personnel Factor 
PCVABUN2 = Perceived Resource Abundance Factor 
PCVABUN3 = Perceived Abundance of Staff Personnel Factor 
PCVUNPRl = Perceived Governmental Unpredictability Factor 
PCVUNPR2 = Perceived Competitor and Client Unpredicta-
bility Factor 
PCVUNPR3 = Perceived Loan Demand Unpredictability Factor 
PCVUNPR4 = Perceived Rates and Investments Unpredicta-
bility Factor 
PCVTHRTl = Perceived Market Competitive Threat Factor 
PCVTHRT2 = Perceived External Threat Factor 
PCVDVRSl = Perceived Diversity Factor 
PCVDYNMl = Perceived Dynamism Factor 
ENVSCANl = Perceived Environmental Scanning Factor 
PCVPERFl = Perceived Performance - "Financial" Factor 
PCVPERF2 = Perceived Performance - "Soft-Performance" 
Factor 
ACTPERFl = Index of Actual Performance Factor 
BOURGEll = Perceived Importance of Market Competitive 
Tactics Factor 
BOURGE12 = Perceived Importance of External Relations 
Factor 
BOURGE13 = Perceived Importance of Means to Enhance 
Customer Service Factor 
BOURGE21 = Perceived Importance of Financial Strength 



















LIST OF VARIABLE MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR S&L'S (Continued) 
BOURGE31 = Perceived Importance of Sources of Funds 
and Cost Consciousness 
BOURGE41 = Perceived Importance of Profit and 
Strength to Maneuver 
BOURGE42 = Perceived Importance of Means to Enhance 
Competitive Manuevers 
ONEFIRMC = One Firm Concentration Ratio 
ONEFIRMD = One Firm Diversity (1 - ONEFIRMC) 
EEDIVRS = Parish Employment Category Diversity Index 
TAXDIVRS = Parish Severance Tax Diversity Index 
BOUNDSPN = Perceived Propensity to Boundary Spanning 
Activity 
LOANDIV = Diversity Index of Firm Loan Categories 
DEPOSDIV = Diversity Index of Deposit Categories 
OFFRATIO = Number of Firm Offices/Total S&L Offices in 
Parish 
TOTFFRATIO = Number of Firm Offices/Total S&L + Bank 
Office in Parish 
FULLOANS = Self-Report Number of Loan Types Offered 
FULLACNT = Self-Report Number of Deposit Types 
Offered 
FULLSERV = Self-Report Number of Services Offered 
HIADVERT = Self-Report Number of Advertising Media Used 
NGOALIMP = Count of Goals-Means Items Scored at 
Important and Very Important 
FACTOR! = Objective Environment Munificence Factor 
FACTOR2 = Objective Environment Variation Type 
Dynamism Factor 
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LIST OF VARIABLE MNEMONICS AND DESCRIPTIONS FOR S&L'S (Continued) 
BETA = Objective Environment Volatility Type 
Synamism Variable 
OTHER VARIABLES : 
PCVGENDC = Perceived General Conditions of 
Environmental Uncertainty, Stability and 
Unpredictability 
ENVTHRT = Perceived General Threat from the 
Environment 
TOTDEPOS = Total Firm Deposits (Savings) 
MKTSHARE = Firm Deposits/Total S&L Deposits in Parish 
AMMKTSH = Firm Deposits/Total S&L and Bank Deposits 
in Parish 
The following papers are. currently available in the Edwin L. Cox School of 




















"Microdata File Merging Through Large-Scale Network Technology," 
by Richard S. Barr and J. Scott Turner 
"Perceived Environmental Uncertainty: An Individual or Environ-
mental Attribute," by Peter Lorenzi, Henry P. Sims, Jr. , and 
John w. Slocum, Jr. 
"A Typology for Integrating Technology, Organization and Job 
Design," by John W. Slocum, Jr., and Henry P. Sims, Jr. 
"·Implementing the Portfolio (SBU) Concept," by Richard A. Bettis 
and William K. Hall 
' "Assessing Organizational Change Approaches: Towards a Comparative 
Typology, " by Don Hellriegel and John W. Slocum, Jr. 
"Constructing a Theory of Accounting--An Axiomatic Approach," by 
Marvin L. Carlson and James W. Lamb 
"Mentors & Managers," by Michael E. McGill 
"Budgeting Capital for R&D: An Application of Option Pricing," 
by John W. Kensinger 
"Financial Terms of Sale and Control of Marketing Channel Conflict," 
by Michael Levy and Dwight Grant 
"Toward An Optimal Customer Service Pfickage," by Michael Levy 
"Controlling the Performance of People in Organizations," by 
Steven Kerr and John W. Slocum, Jr. 
"The Effects of Racial Composition on Neighborhood Succession," 
by Kerry D. Vandell 
"Strategies of Growth: Forms, Characteristics and Returns," by 
Richard D. Miller 
"Organization Role-s, Cognitive Roles, and Problem-Solving Styles," 
by Richard Lee Steckroth, John W. Slocum, Jr., and Henry P. Sims, Jr. 
"New Efficient Equations to Compute the Present Value of Mortgage 
Interest Payments and Accelerated Depreciation Tax Benefits," by 
Elbert B. Greynolds, Jr. 
"Mortgage Quality and the Two-Earner Family: Issues and Estimates," 
by Kerry D. Vandell 
, 
"Comparison of the EEOCC Four-Fifths Rule and A One, Two or Three a 
Binomial Criterion," by Marion Gross Sobol and Paul Ellard 
"Bank Portfolio Management: The Role of Financial Futures," by 
Dwight M. Grant and George Hempel 
"Hedging Uncertain Foreign Exchange Positions," by Mark R. Eaker 
and Dwight M. Grant 
80-110 "Strategic Portfolio Management in the Multibusiness Firm: An 
Implementation Status Report," by Richard A. Bettis and William 
K. Hall 
80-lll "Sources of Performance Differences in Related and Unrelated 
Diversified Firms," by Richard A. Bettis 
80-112 "The Information Needs of Business With Special Application to 
Managerial Decision Making," by Paul Gray 
80-113 "Diversification Strategy, Accounting Determined Risk, and Ac-
counting Determined Return," by Richard A. Bettis and William K. 
Hall 
80-114 "Toward Analytically Precise Definitions of Market Value and 
Highest and Best Use," by Kerry D. Van .. ell 
80-115 "Person-Situation Interaction: An Exploration of Competing 
Models of Fit," by William F. Joyce, John w. Slocum, Jr., and 
Mary Ann Von Glinow 
80-116 "Correlates of Climate Discrepancy," by William F. Joyce and 
John Slocum 
80-117 "Alternative Perspectives on Neighborhood Decline," by Arthur 
P. Solomon and Kerry D. Vandell 
80-121 "Project Abandonment as a Put Option: 
Investment Decision and Operating Risk 
Theory," by John W. Kensinger 
Dealing with the Capital 
Using Option Pricing 
80-122 "The Interrelationships Between Banking Returns and Risks," by 
George H. Hempel 
80-123 "The Environment For Funds Management Decisions In Corning Years," 
by George H. Hempel 
81-100 "A Test of Gouldner's Norm of Reciprocity In A Commercial Marketing 
Research Setting," by Roger Kerin, Thomas Barry, and Alan Dubinsky 
81-200 "Solution Strategies and Algorithm Behavior in Large-Scale Network 
Codes," by Richard s. Barr 
81-201 "The SMU Decision Room Project," by Paul Gray, Julius Aronofsky, 
Nancy W. Berry, Olaf Helmer, Gerald R. Kane, and Thomas E. Perkins 
81-300 "Cash Discounts To Retail Customers: An Alternative To Credit Card 
Performance," by Michael Levy and Charles Ingene 
81-400 "Merchandising Decisions: A New View of Planning and Measuring 
Perforrnance," ' by Michael Levy and Charles A. Ingene 
81-500 "A Methodology For The Formulation And Evaluation Of Energy Goals 
And Policy Alternatives For Israel," by Julius Aronofsky, Reuven 
Karni, and Harry Tankin 
81-501 "Job Redesign: Improving The Quality of Working Life," by John w. 
Slocum, Jr. 
81-600 "Managerial Uncertainty and Performance," by H. Kirk Downey and 
John W. Slocum, Jr. 
81-601 "Compensating Balance, Rationality, and Optimality," by Chun H. 
Lam and Kenneth J. Boudreaux 
81-700 "Federal Income Taxes, Inflation and Holding Periods For Income-
Producing Property," by William B. Brueggeman, Jeffrey D. Fisher, 
and Jerrold J. Stern 
81-800 "The Chinese-U.S. Symposium On Systems Analysis," by Paul Gray 
and Burton v. Dean 
81-801 "The Sensitivity of Policy Elasticities to the Time Period Examined 
in the St. Louis Equation and Other Tests," by Frank J. Bonello and 
William R. Reichenstein 
81-900 "Forecasting Industrial Bond Rating Changes: A Multivariate Model," 
by John W. Peavy, III 
81-110 "Improving Gap Management As A Technique For Reducing Interest Rate 
Risk," by Donald G. Simonson and George H. Hempel 
81-111 "The Visible and Invisible Hand : Source Allocation in the Industrial 
Sector," by Richard A. Bettis and C. K. Prahalad 
81-112 "The Significance of Price-Earnings Ratios on Portfolio Returns," by 
John W. Peavy, III and David A. Goodman 
81-113 "Further Evaluation of Financing Costs for Multinational Subsidiaries," 
by Catherine J. Bruno and Mark R. Eaker 
81-114 "Seven Key Rules For Successful Stock Market Speculation," by David 
Goodman 
81-115 "The Price-Earnings Relative As An Indicator of Investment Returns," 
by David Goodman and John W. Peavy, III 
81-116 "Str ategi c Management for Wholesalers: An Environmental Mana gement 
Perspective," by William L. Cron and Va l a rie A. Zeithaml 
81-117 "Sequential Information Dissemination and Relative Market Efficiency," 
by Christopher B. B3rry and Robert H. Jennings 
81-118 "Modeling Earnings Be havior," by Michael F . van Breda 
81-119 "The Dimensions o f Self-Management," by David Goodman and Leland M. 
Wooton 
81-120 "The Price-Earnings Relatives -A New Twist To The Low-Multiple Strategy," 
by David A. Goodman and John W. Pea vy, III. 
82-100 "Risk Considerations in Modeling Corporate Strategy," by Richard 
A. Bettis 
82-101 "Modern Financial Theory, Corporate Strategy, and Public Policy: 
Three Conundrums," by Richard A. Bettis 
82-102 "Children's Advertising: The Differential Impact of Appeal 
Strategy," by Thomas E. Barry and Richard F. Gunst 
82-103 "A Typology of Small Businesses: Hypothesis and Preliminary 
Study," by Neil C. Churchill and Virginia L. Lewis 
82-104 "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing: A 
Comment and Extension," by Kerry D. Vandell 
82-200 "Equilibrium in a Futures Market," by•Jerome Baesel and Dwight 
Grant 
82-201 "A Market Index Futures Contract and Portfolio Selection," by 
Dwight Grant 
82-202 "Selecting Optimal Portfolios with a Futures Market in a Stock 
Index," by Dwight Grant 
82-203 "Market Index Futures Contracts: Some Thoughts on Delivery 
Dates," by Dwight Grant 
82-204 "Optimal Sequential Futures Trading," by Jerome Baesel and Dwight 
Grant 
82-300 "The Hypothesized Effects of Abilit:iY in the Turnover Process," by 
Ellen F. Jackofsky and Lawrence H. Peters 
82-301 "Teaching A Financial Planning Language As The Principal Computer 
Language for MBA's," by Thomas E. Perkins and Paul Gray 
82-302 "Put Budgeting. Back Into Capital Budgeting," by Michael F. van Breda 
82-400 "Information Dissemination and Portfolio Choice," by Robert H. Jennings 
and Christopher B. Barry 
82-401 "Reality Shock: ' The Link Between Socialization and Organizational 
Commitment," by Roger A. Dean 
82-402 "Reporting on the Annual Report," by Gail E. Farrelly and Gail B. Wright 
82-403 "A Linguistic Analysis of Accounting," by Gail E. Farrelly 
82-600 "The Relationship Between Computerization and Performance: A Strategy 
For Maximizing The Economic Benefits of Computerization," by William 
L. Cron and Marion G. Sobol 
82-601. "Optimal Land Use Planning," by Richard B. Peiser 
82-602 "Variances and indices," by Michael F. van Breda 
82-603 "The Pricing of Small Business Loans," by Jonathan A. Scott 
82-604 "Collateral Requirements and Small Business Loans," by Jonathan A. 
Scott 
82-605 "Validation Strategies For Multiple Regression Analysis: A Tutorial," 
by Marion G. Sobol 
. 
82-700 "Credit Rationing and the Small Business Community," by Jonathan A. 
Scott 
82-701 "Bank Structure and Small Business Loan Markets," by William c. 
Dunkelberg and Jonathan A. Scott 
82-800 "Transportation Evaluation in Community Design: An Extension with 
Equilibrium Route Assignment," by Richard B. Peiser 
' 82..;801 "An Expanded Commercial Paper Rating Scale: Classification of 
Industrial Issuers," by John w. Peavy, III and s. Michael Edgar 
82-802 "Inflation, Risk, and Corporate Profitability: Effects on Common 
Stock Returns," by David A. Goodman and John W. Peavy, III 
82-803 "Turnover and Job Performance: An Integrated Process Model," by 
Ellen F. Jackofsky 
82-804 "An Empirical Evaluation of Statistical Matching Methodologies," by 
Richard A. Barr, William H. Stewart, and John Scott Turner 
82-805 "Residual Income Analysis: A Method of Inventory Investment Alloca-
tion and Evaluation," by Michael Levy and Charles A. Ingene 
i 
82-806 "Analytical Review Developments in Practice: Misconceptions, Poten-
tial Applications, and Field Experience," by Wanda Wallace 
82-807 "Using Financial Planning Languages For Simulation," by Paul Gray 
82-808 "A Look At How Managers' Minds Work," by John w. Slocum, Jr. and 
Don Hellriegel 
82-900 "'!'he lmpact of Price Earnings Ratios on PorttolJ.o Returns," by John 
W. Peavy, III and David A. Goodman 
82-901 "Replicating Electric Utility Short-Term Credit Ratings," by John w. 
Peavy, III and S. Michael Edgar 
82-902 "Job Turnover Versus Company Turnover: Reassessment of the March and 
Simon Participation Model," by Ellen F. Jackofsky and Lawrence H. 
Peters 
82-903 "Investment Management By Multiple Managers : An Agency-Theoreti c Ex-
planation," by Christopher B. Barr y and Laura T. Starks 
82-904 "The Senior Marketing Officer- An Academic Perspective," by James T. 
Rothe 
82-905 "The Impact of Cable Television on Subscriber and Nonsubscriber Be-
havior," by James T. Rothe, Michael G. Harvey, and George c. Michael 
82-110 "Reasons for Quitting: A Comparison of Part-Time and Full-Time 
Employees," by James R. Salter, Lawrence H. Peters, and Ellen F. 
Jackofsky 
82-111 "Integrating Financial Portfolio Analysis with Product Portfolio 
Models," by Vi jay Mahajan and Jerry Wind 
82-112 ''A Non-Uniform Influence Innovation Diffusion Model of New Product 
Acceptance," by Christopher J. Easingwood, Vijay Mahajan, and Eitan 
Muller 
82-113 "The Acceptability of Regression Analysis as Evidence in a Courtroom -
Implications for the Auditor," by Wanda A. Wallace 
82-114 "A Further Inquiry Into The Market Value And Earnings' Yield Anomalies," 
by John W. Peavy, III and David A. Goodman 
82-120 "Compensating Balances, Deficiency Fees and Lines of Credit: An Opera-
tional Model," by Chun H. Lam and Kenneth J. Boudreaux 
82-121 "Toward a Formal Model of Optimal Seller Behavior in the Real Estate Trans-
actions Process," by Kerry Vandell 
82-122 "Estimates of the Effect of School Desegregation Plans on Housing 
Values Over Time," by Kerry D. Vandell and Robert H. Zerbst 
82-123 "Compensating Balances, Deficiency Fees and Lines of Credit," by Chun 
H. Lam and Kenneth J. BoudreaUx 
83-100 "Teachi ng Software System Design" An Experiential Approach," by Thomas 
E. Perkins 
83-101 "Risk Perceptions of Institutional Investors," by Gail E. Farrelly and 
William R. Reichenstein 
83-102 "An Interactive Approach to Pension Fund Asset Management," by David A. 
Goodman and John w. Peavy, III 
83-103 "Technology, Structure, and Workgroup Effectiveness: A Test of a 
Contingency Model,;, by Loui s W. Fry and John w. Slocum, Jr. 
83-104 "Environment, Strategy and Performance: An Empirical Analysis in Two 
Service Industries," by William R. Bigler, Jr .. and. Banwari L. Kedia 
